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DEFINING THE DoCTRINE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION IN Mississippi:
A REBUTrABLE PRESUMPTION THAT HOMEMAKING SERVICES ARE AS
VALUABLE TO THE ACQUISITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
AS BREADWINNING SERVICES
Johnson v. Johnson
650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994)
John R. Dowd
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, Mississippi adhered to the title theory of marital property distri-
bution.1 This system simply awarded the marital assets to the title-holding
spouse upon divorce. The title theory often resulted in unjust distributions, espe-
cially in the case of traditional families with most property titled in the name of
the husband.2 A housewife and mother often found herself left with nothing but
a claim for alimony,3 the receipt of which was many times suspect at best.
4
1. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 582 (Miss. 1988) (Prather, J., concurring); Hinton v. Hinton, 179 So.
2d 846, 847 (Miss. 1965); Windham v. Windham, 67 So. 2d 467, 472 (Miss. 1953); McCraney v. McCraney, 43 So. 2d
872, 873 (Miss. 1950).
2. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 926 (Miss. 1994). The same unfair results ensued when both
spouses worked, but one spouse's salary was devoted to investments while the other spouse's salary was devoted to pay-
ing the family's expenses. Id.
3. This Note focuses on issues relating to the division of marital property between spouses incidental to a
divorce in Mississippi. Several other important issues are involved in divorces, two of which are periodic and lump-
sum alimony. Alimony is an expansive area of domestic relations law in its own right and is for the most part beyond
the scope of this Casenote. However, a brief description of the two types of alimony is in order.
Periodic alimony is the most common type of alimony awarded in the courts of Mississippi. See Brendel v. Brendel,
566 So. 2d 1269, 1272 (Miss. 1990). It generally terminates automatically upon the death or remarriage of the obligee.
Holleman v. Holleman, 527 So. 2d 90, 92 (Miss. 1988). In addition, periodic alimony awards are subject to modifica-
tion in the event of a material change of circumstances subsequent to the original decree. Shearer v. Shearer, 540 So.
2d 9, 12 (Miss. 1989).
Periodic alimony arises out of the "duty of a husband to support his wife." East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931 n.2
(Miss. 1986) (citing Gresham v. Gresham, 21 So. 2d 414 (1945)). The Supreme Court of Mississippi has also recog-
nized that alimony may be awarded to the husband. Pratt v. Pratt, 623 So. 2d 258, 261 (Miss. 1993). It is generally
used by the chancellor to balance the effect of divorce on each spouse's accustomed standard of living. See Wood v.
Wood, 495 So. 2d 503, 506 (Miss. 1986). The chancellor is required to consider the reasonable needs of the obligee,
and the right of the obligor to maintain a decent standard of living. Massey v. Massey, 475 So. 2d 802, 803 (Miss.
1985). The factors to be considered by a chancellor, in granting periodic alimony were first set out in Brabham v.
.Brabham, 84 So. 2d 147, 153 (Miss. 1955). See also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).
Lump-sum alimony involves a single payment in satisfaction of all support claims against the paying spouse. Wray
v. Wray, 394 So. 2d 1341, 1344 (Miss. 1981). It is a final settlement between spouses and is not subject to modifica-
tion. Bowe v. Bowe, 557 So. 2a 793, 795 (Miss. 1990). Lump-sum alimony is often used as an adjustment to property
distribution to prevent an unfair division. Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300, 1303 (Miss. 1982). It has been
described as a method of dividing marital property under the guise of alimony. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS §
14.8 (2d ed. 1976). Lump-sum alimony, unlike periodic alimony, "is more in the nature of an award to the payee
spouse of an interest rightfully owned by the payee, rather than a fulfillment of a spouse's duty to support the other
spouse." Thomas W Crockett & Walter P. Neely, Mississippi s New Equitable Distribution Rules: The Ferguson
Guidelines and Valuation, 15 Miss. C. L. REv. 415, 416 (1995) [hereinafter Crockett & Neely].
Although alimony and property division are distinct concepts, "together they command the entire field of financial
settlement of divorce." Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929. As a practical matter, the chancellor will often consider alimony
and property division together because "where one expands, the other must recede." Id.
Chancellors are free to award lump-sum alimony, award periodic alimony, or both, in addition to making an equi-
table division of the property. Id. Limiting the scope of this Note to the distribution of marital property upon divorce
is in no way intended to diminish the importance of alimony and the many other issues that arise incident to a divorce.
4. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 926. See also infra notes 246 and 248.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently abandoned the "title theory," and
adopted the doctrine of equitable distribution.' The adoption of this doctrine
forced chancellors to consider the sacrifices of a homemaker who has subordi-
nated his or her earning potential for the best interests of the family.' Hemsley v.
Hemsley' established a presumption that the value of "homemaking services"
was equal to that of "bread-winning services."8 Johnson v. Johnson9 reaffirmed
the Hemsley presumption, and explained that the presumption could be rebutted
upon a proper showing.'
This Note analyzes the evolution of Mississippi law from the title theory to the
doctrine of equitable distribution. In addition, it will explain how the Mississippi
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson will help protect assets acquired by the par-
ties prior to marriage, gifts, inheritances, and other types of property from being
divided upon divorce. Finally, this Note illustrates the Mississippi Supreme
Court's recent recognition of the value of domestic services, and concludes by
discussing how all of these changes better reflect the realities of modern mar-
riage.
II. FACTS
Wayne and Jane Johnson were married on June 29, 1962, when they were both
about eighteen years old.1 After the birth of their first child, Kendall, in 1968,
they made a mutual decision that Jane cease working outside the home and
devote her full time and energy to taking care of the home, Kendall, and any
other children that the marriage might produce. 2 Two other children were subse-
quently born to the marriage. 3
During the marriage, Jane inherited substantial assets from her parents.' 4 She
used $153,000 of these assets to "pay family expenses, to add to Wayne's savings
account, and to purchase a... van titled to Wayne."' 5 Wayne returned $66,000
of this amount to Jane's separate account. 6 In addition, the Johnsons had a debt
of approximately $142,000."
5. See Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
6. Id. at 306.
7. 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994).
8. Id. at 915.
9. 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994).
10. Id. at 1286.
11. Id. at 1283.
12. Id. at 1284. They agreed that Wayne would be the "breadwinner" and Jane would be the "caretaker" of
the home and family. Id.
13. Id. at 1283. The other two children were Kyle, who was born in 1974, and Kristin, who was born in
1980. Id.
14. Id. at 1284. These assets included $50,000 in cash, $3,200 in a checking account, a house valued at
$40,000, timber land worth approximately $98,000, and marketable timber valued at $95,000. Id.
15. Id. The $153,000 came from four timber cuttings from Jane's inherited timber land over a 12-year peri-
od. Id.
16. Id. at 1285.
17. Id. at 1284. The debt resulted from treatment for their son, Kendall, who required lengthy and expen-
sive hospitalizations for mental illness. Id. Unpaid medical bills for Kendall's treatment resulted in a $142,000
judgment against Wayne. Id. In addition, Wayne had "assisted Kendall by paying his car notes, medical insur-
ance, medicine bills, and by giving him spending money." Id.
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The Johnsons separated on June 4, 1990, and on February 27, 1991, Jane filed
a complaint for divorce on the grounds of Wayne's adultery.18 At the time of
trial, Wayne was a division director for a Mississippi power company and was
earning an annual salary of $88,450.19 In addition to his salary, Wayne had a
vested interest in an employee savings plan valued at $45,415 and an employee
stock ownership plan valued at $6,523.20 Jane, on the other hand, had served as a
homemaker during the marriage instead of developing her own earning potential
or building her own retirement fund.21
The chancellor granted Jane a divorce on the grounds of adultery.22 He found
that Wayne had "great earning potential" in his executive position, as opposed to
Jane, "whose only anticipated income was the timber proceeds from logging and
rental income of her inherited property."2 Consequently, Jane was awarded sole
use of the marital home.24 The chancellor also ordered Wayne to pay the mort-
gage payments on the home with the option of discontinuing these payments
upon the children's majority.25 Jane also "received a fifty percent interest in
Wayne's retirement plan, his employee stock ownership plan, and his employee
savings plan."
26
The Mississippi Supreme Court reaffirmed the presumption that the parties
made equal contributions to the acquisition of all property acquired during the
marriage,27 but held that the presumption could be rebutted upon a proper show-
ing.28 In addition, the court held that property inherited by one spouse is suffi-
cient to rebut the presumption, and is thus not subject to division with the non-
inheriting spouse.29 Finally, the court remanded the case to the chancery court so
that the chancellor could explain his findings on the record in light of the recent
developments in Mississippi's judicially-implemented version of equitable distri-
bution.3"
18. Id.
19. Id. Wayne's gross monthly salary was $7,371. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Jane did not work after 1968, when she and Wayne agreed that she would stop working to take care
of the children and the domestic services. Id. In addition, Jane had to borrow $56,000 against her nonmarital
assets to support herself between the couple's separation and the divorce hearing in 1992. Id.
22. Id. at 1283.
23. Id. at 1285.
24. Id. at 1284. Jane was awarded custody of the minor children and $1,116 per month in child support as
well. Id.
25. Id. Upon the children's majority, Wayne could grant Jane all of the equity in the property and discon-
tinue making the mortgage payments if he so desired. Id.
26. Id. In addition, Wayne was ordered to transfer the title to the couple's 1984 van to Jane. Id. He was
also required to maintain medical insurance for Jane for three years and for the children during their minority.
Id. The chancellor concluded by ordering each parent to pay fifty percent of college expenses for the children's
attendance at a state college. Id.
27. Id. at 1285-86. This presumption was set forth in Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss.
1994).
28. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 1994).
29. Id. at 1286 n.2.
30. Id. at 1287.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. "Equitable and Just"
The Mississippi Legislature has not spoken on the subject of marital property
division upon divorce for over a century and a half.31 The only statute that gives
guidance in this area is section 93-5-23 of the Mississippi Code Annotated,
which allows a chancery court discretion to divide a married couple's property in
an "equitable and just" fashion upon divorce. 2 Instead of adopting a more
detailed statutory scheme for marital property division issues, the Mississippi
Legislature has left to the Mississippi Supreme Court the job of giving specific
definition to this area of the law.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted section 93-5-23 as giving
chancellors broad discretion in ordering an equitable division of property.
33
However, there has been considerable litigation over just what constitutes an
"equitable division." It has long been held that "equitable" does not mean
"equal," and that there is no automatic right to an equal division of property. 4
As long as the chancellor supports his decision with specific findings of fact
supported by credible evidence, his or her findings will usually not be disturbed
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. 35  However, the meaning of "equitable
and just" in the statute has recently undergone significant changes with the
court's continuing recognition of the changing roles of women in society.36
B. The Title Theory
1. In General
Different states apply various methods to divide a couple's assets upon
divorce.37 Until 1993, Mississippi followed the title theory.38 The title theory
prohibited the chancery court from divesting "a spouse of title to real property
31. Crockett & Neely, supra note 3, at 415.
32. MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-5-23 (1993). Section 93-5-23 reads in pertinent part as follows:
When a divorce shall be decreed from the bonds of matrimony, the court may, in its discretion, hav-
ing regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, as may seem equitable and
just, make all orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage,
and also touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or the husband, or any allowance to be
made to her or him ....
Id.
33. See Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302, 305 (Miss. 1993); Brown v. Brown, 574 So. 2d 688, 690 (Miss.
1990).
34. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921
(Miss. 1994); Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993); Brown v. Brown, 574 So. 2d 688 (Miss. 1990);
Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So. 2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986).
35. Bell v. Parker, 563 So. 2d 594, 597 (Miss. 1990). See also Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 924; Newsom v.
Newsom, 557 So. 2d 511,514 (Miss. 1990).
36. Crockett & Neely, supra note 3, at 415.
37. States generally follow either the equitable distribution system, the community property system, or the
separate property system. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 925-26 (Miss. 1994). The separate property
system is often referred to as the "title theory." Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 583 (Miss. 1988) (Prather, J.,
concurring).
38. Draper, 627 So. 2d at 305.
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and forcing that spouse to deed the property to the other by judicial decree."39
This theory was based on a belief that stability in real estate titles must be main-
tained to protect lienholders' rights,4" and on a failure of the courts to recognize
the value of homemaker contributions to a marriage.41 The title theory was often
responsible for gross inequities in the division of marital property.42
One example of an inequitable result from the application of the title theory
was the Mississippi Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Hinton v. Hinton.3 In
Hinton, the wife appealed the chancellor's judgement which failed to award her
an interest in a farm titled in the name of her husband, even though she had con-
tributed to its acquisition. 4 The chancellor's decree specifically stated that Mrs.
Hinton had no right to an interest in Mr. Hinton's real property.4 Mrs. Hinton
contended that she was entitled to an equitable interest in the farm for her contri-
butions, and that she should not be denied such interest simply because the farm
was titled in the name of her husband.46
The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's finding that Mrs.
Hinton was entitled to no interest in the farm.47 Allowing Mrs. Hinton an interest
in the property titled in the name of her spouse, the court explained, "would be
tantamount to adopting to a limited extent the community property system."48
The court was unwilling to take the drastic step of abandoning the title theory,49
and stated that it would be useless to relitigate this issue on remand.50
39. Jones, 532 So. 2d at 581. In some cases the court would impose a constructive trust upon one person's
property for the benefit of the other spouse who had made a significant contribution towards its purchase. Id.
at 583. However, the power to confer a constructive trust is only "available in limited circumstances under stan-
dard trust principles." Id.
40. Id. at 583. Justice Prather explained that this argument has no validity because no "equitable distribu-
tion rule could ever alter, change or modify lienholders' priorities'" Id.
41. See Cox v. Cox, 183 So. 2d 921, 923 (Miss. 1966) (stating that the "right of the husband to the services
of the wife is a reciprocal marital obligation to that of the wife's right to the support from her husband," and
denying the wife any interest in the property because she did not "put any money into the purchase of the
homestead at the time of the purchase").
42. See id. at 923; Hinton v. Hinton, 179 So. 2d 846, 848 (Miss. 1965); Windham v. Windham, 67 So. 2d
467, 472 (Miss. 1953); McCraney v. McCraney, 43 So. 2d 872, 873 (Miss. 1950).
43. 179 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1965).
44. Id. at 847. The Hintons were married when she was 23 and he was 46. Id. at 848. Shortly after their
marriage, Mr. Hinton purchased a small farm near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. Id. The family moved into an old
farm house and Mr. Hinton began farming the property. Id. Mrs. Hinton assisted her husband in doing various
types of farm-related work, in addition to various domestic services. Id. Mr. Hinton subsequently built a new
house on the farm which he paid for from money earned in his farming operation. Id.
After about ten years of this arrangement, Mrs. Hinton decided that she wanted to become a nurse. Id. She
began working in this capacity in Hattiesburg and contributed some of her income to help pay family expenses.
Id. The marriage eventually deteriorated and, after fifteen years of marriage, Mrs. Hinton filed for divorce on
the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. at 847. Mr. Hinton denied the allegations in her com-
plaint and filed a counterclaim on the same ground. Id.
The chancellor entered a decree granting both parties an absolute divorce. Id. He awarded Mrs. Hinton
$2,000 for alimony and attorney's fees, but failed to designate how much was alimony and how much was for
attorney's fees. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 848.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The court was reluctant "to engraft on the laws of [Mississippi] features of [the community proper-
ty] system." Id.
50. Id.
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2. Exceptions to the Title Theory
The Supreme Court of Mississippi carved out so many exceptions that over
time the title theory itself became "the exception, not the rule.""1 By 1988, all of
the other forty-nine states had adopted laws permitting a court to distribute prop-
erty upon divorce regardless of which spouse held the title.52 Even many
Mississippi Supreme Court opinions had expressed how useless it was to hang on
to this antique theory of marital property division. 3 One of the most influential
of these opinions came in Jones v. Jones,4 a 1988 Mississippi Supreme Court
decision.
In Jones, the husband, Fred, appealed the chancellor's judgement which divest-
ed him of title to property for the benefit of his wife, Becky.5 The chancellor
found that divestiture of title was justified because Becky had made substantial
monetary and in-kind contributions toward the acquisition of the couple's proper-
ty.56 Fred contended that, under the title theory, the chancery court was without
authority to decree an equitable division of property titled- in his name exclusive-
ly.57 However, the Supreme Court of Mississippi disagreed, and explained that
the title theory had been "effectively eroded in cases where the wife contributed
her money and labor toward the economic success of the marriage."58 Justice
51. See Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 581-82 (Miss. 1988) (Prather, J., concurring) (elucidating the many
exceptions to the title theory); see also Wats v. Watts, 466 So. 2d 889 (Miss. 1985).
52. Jones, 532 So. 2d at 581-82. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington are community property states. Id. n.2. In community property states, the property is presumed to
be owned jointly by the husband and wife, and they are entitled to share equally in the "marital property," which
generally includes all property substantially contributed to by both parties. Id. at 582. All of the other states
follow the doctrine of equitable distribution. Id. n.3. Thirty-nine states have adopted equitable distribution by
statute, and two states (Florida and South Carolina) by judicial decision. Id. (citing JotN P. MCCAHEY,
VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 3.01 (1988)). Although many states have followed the
title theory in the past, by 1988, Mississippi remained its final adherent. Id. at 583.
53. See Jones, 532 So. 2d at 583-84 (Prather, J., concurring); Watts, 466 So. 2d at 890. In Watts, the
Mississippi Supreme Court stated that "while [the title theory] is the general rule, it is not an absolute rule." Id.
at 890. The court went on to elucidate several exceptions to the title theory. Id. The Watts Court concluded
with a statement which has helped shape Mississippi divorce law: "It would offend equity to uproot one of the
spouses from the homestead property which was jointly accumulated simply because that spouse's name did not
appear on the deed thereto." Id. at 891. See also Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So. 2d 624 (Miss. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 878 (1951).
54. 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988).
55. Fred and Becky Jones were married in 1954. Id. at 575. Two daughters were born of the marriage. Id.
During the first years of their marriage, Becky worked as a billing clerk at a transport company to support the
couple while Fred attended high school and college. Id. Fred had just returned from service in Korea when the
Joneses were married, and was able to pay for college with funds provided by the G.I. Bill. Id. Fred graduated
from college in 1958 with a degree in Business Administration. Id.
Becky's job as a billing clerk enabled the couple to purchase their first residence. Id. However, in 1959 she
was forced to stop working because of the approaching birth of their first child. Id. at 577. The chancellor
found that the properties were "accumulated by the parties," and that Becky "contribute[d] to the acquisition
and operation of the property." Id.
By 1969, Fred and Becky had accumulated approximately ten separate undeveloped tracts of land in addition
to a large shopping center. Id. However, their marriage went downhill and, in 1983, after nearly thirty years of
marriage, Becky filed for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id.
56. Id. The court actually only awarded Becky two-fifths of the property, because she had conveyed three
of the parcels of land to her daughter and brother just before she filed for divorce. Id. Fred appealed the chan-
cellor's decision, arguing that the court erred when it divested him of title in the land for the benefit of the
spouse. Id.
57. Id. at 578.
58. Id. at 579.
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Robertson wrote the opinion of the court, which went on to elucidate several
methods that chancellors were authorized to use in dividing the marital property
upon divorce. 9
The first method mentioned by the majority is used when a spouse has assisted
his wife or her husband in the accumulation of wealth during the marriage, but
has no property titled in his or her own name.6" In this situation, Justice
Robertson explained, the contributing spouse may be awarded lump-sum alimony
reflecting an equitable portion of the increase in the net worth of the title-holding
spouse.61 In addition, he stated that the payment of the lump-sum award could be
secured by placing an equitable lien upon the property of the debtor spouse.62
Another method for the chancellors to consider in dividing the marital proper-
ty, the majority explained, was only possible when a spouse had made a "material
contribution toward the acquisition of property which is titled in the name of the
other [spouse].""3 In this situation, the court explained, the chancellor could look
beyond the state of title and award the deprived spouse an equitable interest in
such property. 4
The majority concluded by affirming the decision of the chancellor.6 Justice
Robertson explained that because of Becky's substantial contributions - both in
cash and in her service working at the business - the law gave the chancellor
the authority to order an equitable division of the marital property including the
transfer of title to Becky.66 However, the court still refused to abandon the title
theory when dividing a couple's property upon divorce.
Justice Prather wrote an eloquent concurrence in Jones which called for the
outright abolition of the title theory.6 She explained that when the wife's prima-
ry contribution to the marriage has been as a homemaker, there was simply no
reason to allow her lump-sum alimony but not an equitable interest in the marital
59. Id. at 580.
60. Id.
61. Id. See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 293 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1974). In Clark, the wife had worked eleven years
in her husband's business with no compensation. Id. at 448. During this time, the couple had accumulated
$164,000 in assets. Id. at 449. The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that under these circumstances the wife
is entitled to a fair allowance. Id. This allowance can be accomplished by a lump-sum alimony award which
"reflects not only the husband's duty to care for his former wife," but also her share in the marital assets. Id.
See also Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300 (Miss. 1982); Miller v. Miller, 298 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 1974).
62. Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 580 (Miss. 1988). See also Clark, 293 So. 2d at 450; Buckalew v.
Stewart, 229 So. 2d 559, 562 (Miss. 1969).
63. Jones, 532 So. 2d at 580.
64. Id. See also Chrismond v. Chrismond, 52 So. 2d 624 (1951) (affirming the equitable division of an
unmarried couple's real and personal property).
The court also explained that a property settlement agreement is specifically enforceable, even though it
requires one spouse to divest himself or herself of title for the benefit of the other spouse. Jones, 532 So. 2d at
580 (citing Wray v. Langston, 380 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Miss. 1980)). The Wray Court had explained that the
divorce decree did not actually operate to divest the husband of title, but rather to enforce the agreement
entered into between the parties. Wray, 380 So. 2d at 1263.
65. Jones, 532 So. 2d at 581.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 581 (Prather, J., concurring). "[A] candid assessment of the facts of this case suggest that we
ought to confront directly the continued viability of one of our longstanding rules of law." Id.
1996]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
property.68 Justice Prather further explained that Mississippi was the only state
which still held on to the title theory.69
Justice Prather, at least implicitly, suggested that Mississippi consider adopting
the doctrine of equitable distribution, which most states had already adopted by
statute or judicial decision.7" She concluded by stating that the title theory had
outlived any usefulness that it may have once had,7 and urged the court to abol-
ish this rule which could not be "justified as an original proposition" nor by any
policy reason.72 Nevertheless, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not directly
confront the continued viability of the title theory until five years later in Draper
v. Draper.
73
3. Abolition of the Title Theory
In Draper, the husband, Doug, appealed the chancellor's divorce decree which
ordered him to convey property titled in his name to his wife, Joan, upon the
couple's divorce. 74 Joan had worked for the entire thirty-year marriage except for
two intervals in which she ceased working to give birth to and raise the couple's
two children. 7' Doug contended that the chancellor was without authority to
divest him of title to property76 because Mississippi adhered to the title theory of
property distribution in divorce cases. 77 After considering all of the judicially-
68. Id. Justice Prather explained that, as a practical matter, often the only way the jusband can satisfy the
lump-sum judgment is to sell the property anyway. Id. at 582.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 582-83.
71. Id. at 584.
72. Id.
73. 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
74. Id. at 303. Doug and Joan Draper were married in December of 1961. Id. Two children were born of
the marriage. Id. At the time of the couple's marriage, Joan had just graduated from college with a B.S. degree
in education and Doug was in his last quarter of undergraduate school. Id.
Doug asked Joan for a divorce in February of 1989, but Joan wanted to try and save the marriage, Id. at 304.
After a failed attempt at saving the marriage, Doug moved out in July of 1989. Id. Joan filed for divorce in
October of 1990 after learning of Doug's affair with another woman. Id. Doug counterclaimed on the ground
of habitually cruel and inhuman treatment. Id. He testified that Joan smoked and refused to quit, worked too
many crossword puzzles, watched too much television, was unaffectionate toward him, and refused to invite
friends over to their home. Id. The chancellor denied Doug's counterclaim. Id.
The chancellor granted Joan a divorce on the grounds of adultery. Id. The chancellor then equitably divided
all of the marital property, granting Joan the marital home and personal property therein, the lot adjoining the
home, and $125,000 cash. Id. Furthermore, Doug was ordered to "maintain and pay the premium on a life
insurance policy in the amount of $70,000." Id. Finally, Joan received thirty-five percent (35%) of the total
value of Doug's retirement plan. Id.
75. Id. at 303. Joan began working soon after they were married, and in March of 1962 Doug began gradu-
ate school. Id. In November of 1962 Joan quit working due to her pregnancy with their first child. Id.
However, she returned to the work force in 1963 and continued working until 1967 when she quit due to her
pregnancy with the couple's second child. Id. In the spring of 1968, Doug completed his doctorate degree. Id.
Doug completed a post-doctoral fellowship and his internship, and in 1972 entered into private practice as a
clinical psychologist. Id. Joan continued to work during most of the marriage except for one four-year interval
to care for the young children and one seven-year interval to help the couple's son who was having trouble in
school. Id. In 1988, Joan quit working because she was unhappy with the stress her job generated. Id. at 304.
In addition, Doug was earning approximately $200,000 a year and Joan felt it was unnecessary for her to work.
Id. Doug strongly disapproved of Joan's decision to quit her job. Id. Nevertheless, Joan decided to return to
college and pursue a master's degree in counseling. Id.
76. Id. at 305. The home and adjoining lot were jointly owned by Doug and Joan, but the retirement plan
was titled only in Doug's name. Id.
77. Id.
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created exceptions to the title theory, the supreme court rejected Doug's con-
tention by formally abolishing the title theory:
Justice Prather stated in her concurrence in Jones that the old title theory in
Mississippi was eroded, but not dead. Today we write its obituary. The chancel-
lor in a divorce case now has the authority to divest title from one spouse, and
vest it in the other spouse, when equitably dividing the marital assets.78
Doug also contended that Joan was not entitled to thirty-five percent of his
retirement fund since she did not contribute to its accumulation.79 The majority
rejected this argument by stating that the chancellor was not limited to a consid-
eration of the cash contributions of each party to the accumulation of the proper-
ty.80 The court noted that "[i]t is sufficient contribution if one party renders ser-
vices generally regarded as domestic in nature." '81
Draper finally abolished the prohibition against the chancery court's divesti-
ture of title to property incident to a divorce.82 In addition, the court sent a mes-
sage to the lower courts to consider non-financial contributions by a spouse
when equitably dividing marital assets upon divorce.83 The Mississippi Supreme
Court had finally abandoned the title theory method of property distribution and
"evolved into an equitable distribution system." 4
C. Defining the Doctrine of Equitable
Distribution in Mississippi
Now that the Supreme Court of Mississippi had written the "obituary" to the
title theory, it was time to shape the doctrine of equitable distribution.85 In defin-
ing this doctrine the court was limited by the "inherent limitations in the shaping
of [the] common law" which generally only allow the court to consider the factu-
al situation before it.86 However, the court often went beyond the factual situa-
tion before it to aid the chancellors in areas the court had not yet addressed. One
example of this was the court's opinion in Ferguson v. Ferguson, decided in July
of 1994.87
78. Id.
79. Id. at 306.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 305.
83. Id. at 306.
84. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 927 (Miss. 1994).
85. Though there is no precise definition for "equitable distribution," it basically refers to the authority of
the courts to divest a spouse of title if necessary for an equitable division, and recognizes that a non-working
spouse's efforts contribute to the acquisition of the marital estate. Id. (citing Lee R. Russ, Annotation,
Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4th 481,484 (1985)). Therefore, even though Mississippi
had attempted to equitably divide marital property for a long time, it was not a true "equitable distribution"
jurisdiction until the prohibition against divestment of title was lifted in Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302
(Miss. 1993).
86. Crockett & Neely, supra note 3, at 415.
87. 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994).
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1. The Ferguson Guidelines
In Ferguson, the husband, Billy, appealed the chancellor's judgement awarding
his wife, Linda, an equitable interest in property titled in his name.88 Linda had
served as a homemaker for most of the marriage, taking care of the domestic ser-
vices as well as the couple's two children.89 The Supreme Court of Mississippi
sat en banc to hear the arguments in Ferguson. Justice Prather authored the
majority opinion." She first discussed the background of the different methods
of marital property distribution, and formally announced that Mississippi would
become an equitable distribution state.9
The majority next addressed the question of when rights to marital assets vest
in a spouse. 2 Justice Prather explained that a spouse has no vested rights in any
marital assets prior to the entry of a judgment or decree pursuant to divorce.93 In
determining exactly what assets are subject to division upon divorce, the court
directed the chancery courts to consult its decision in Hemsley v. Hemsley,94
decided on the same day as Ferguson.9
Given the recent developments in the area of marital property distribution,
Justice Prather felt compelled to create guidelines for chancellors to follow when
attempting to equitably distribute marital property.9 8 She responded by pro-
88. Linda and Billy Ferguson were married in April, 1967. Id. at 929. Linda gave birth to two children
during the marriage. id. During their marriage, Linda worked part of the time as a homemaker and caretaker
of the children and part of the time as a cosmetologist/beautician. Id. At the time of the divorce, Billy worked
as a cable repair technician for South Central Bell, earning approximately $1700 per month after taxes and
other miscellaneous expenses. Id. at 936. In May of 1991, Linda filed for divorce on the ground of adultery.
Id. at 929. Billy denied this allegation and counterclaimed for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Id.
The chancellor denied Billy's request for a divorce and awarded the divorce to Linda on the ground of adul-
tery. Id. at 929-30. Linda also received: (1) the marital home and its contents with the four acres of land sur-
rounding it, debt free (Billy was ordered to assume the mortgages on the house); (2) one-half interest in Billy's
pension plan, stock ownership plan, and savings plan; and (3) lump-sum alimony in the sum of $30,000,
payable at the rate of $10,000 per year for 3 years. Id. at 930. Billy was awarded: (1) 33 acres ofjointly owned
and accumulated real property, (2) all the farm equipment, (3) a leasehold interest on all farm property, (4) a
cattle operation, and (5) his 100 shares in a mobile home park. Id. at 935.
89. Id. at 929.
90. Id. at 925.
91. Id. at 927. Justice Prather explained that "through an evolution of case law, this Court has abandoned
the title theory method of distribution of marital assets and evolved into an equitable distribution system." Id.
92. Id. at 927-28.
93. Id. at 928. The vesting of rights "is committed to the discretion and conscience of the [chancery] court,
having in mind all of the equities and other relevant facts and circumstances." Id. (quoting Brown v. Brown,
574 So. 2d 688, 691 (Miss. 1990)).
94. 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994). See discussion infra notes 138-64 and accompanying text.
95. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
96. Id.
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nouncing a non-exhaustive list of factors for chancellors to consider in dividing
property upon divorce."
The majority stated that the law of equitable distribution would be further
defined as different factual situations appeared in future cases.98 Justice Prather
explained that homemaker contributions should not be measured "by a mechani-
cal formula, but on the contribution to the economic and emotional well-being of
the family unit."99 In addition, she stated that one of the goals of equitable distri-
bution is to conclude the parties' legal relationship, leaving each spouse in a self-
sufficient state.1"'
The court further explained that the fair market value of the assets should be
determined before any attempt at division was made. 1" In addition, the majority
stated that the "chancellor may divide marital assets ... as well as award periodic
and/or lump sum alimony, as equity demands.' 0 2  Furthermore, Justice Prather
explained that fairness is the prevailing guideline, and directed the chancellors to
include their findings of fact and conclusions of law to aid in appellate review.10 3
The court then turned to the case before it to apply these new principles." 4
Billy first contended that Linda's domestic services in no way contributed
toward the acquisition of his pension plan, stock ownership plan, or company
97. The Ferguson guidelines are as follows:
1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in deter-
mining contribution are as follows:
a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property;
b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by
quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and
c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of
the spouse accumulating the assets;
2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital
assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise;
3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution;
4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distrib-
ution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance
or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;
5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of
the proposed distribution;
6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate
periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties;
7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets,
income and earning capacity; and,
8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered.
Id. at 928. See also Crockett & Neely, supra note 3 for an excellent analysis of the origins of each of the guide-
lines and implications the guidelines will have on the law of Mississippi.
Whether or not the chancery courts are required to consider these guidelines is somewhat unclear from the
opinion in Ferguson. The court first states that it "directs" the chancery courts to follow the guidelines, but
then seems to cave in when it "suggests" that the chancery courts follow the guidelines "where applicable."
Id. at 928.
98. Id. at 929.
99. Id. (citing LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 322 (W. Va. 1983)).
100. Id.
101. Id. The court explained that expert witnesses may be crucial to establish valuation of assets, particular-
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savings and security plan, but the court found no merit in this contention." 5 The
majority reasoned that even though "contributions of domestic services are not
made directly to a retirement fund, they are nonetheless valid material contribu-
tions which indirectly contribute to any number of marital assets, thereby making
such assets jointly acquired.""1 6 The court concluded by explaining that because
of Linda's contributions as a homemaker and a wage earner, she was entitled to
some portion of the retirement funds titled in Billy's name.0 7
Billy next contended that the chancellor lacked authority to order him to con-
vey to Linda his one-half interest in the marital home and surrounding four
acres. 8 The majority found no merit in this contention, and stated that under
current case law the chancellor was well within his authority in divesting Billy of
his one-half interest in the property.'0 9
The court remanded all issues relating to the marital property division for fur-
ther consideration in light of the new guidelines pronounced by Justice Prather in
the majority opinion.11 On remand, the court required a determination of the
value of the assets along with a thorough explanation for the basis of the chan-
cellor's award."'
Three justices wrote separate opinions, each concurring in part and dissenting
in part."2 Chief Justice Hawkins agreed with "the excellent factors" set forth by
the majority for chancellors to consider when dividing marital property." 3
However, he felt that the abolition of the title theory was unnecessary," 4 and that
105. Id. at 933. The chancery court had awarded Linda a one-half interest in the pension plan (valued at
$400.20), and a one-half interest in the stock ownership plan (valued at $17,060.45). Id. at 933, 938. In addi-
tion, the chancellor specifically ordered that all future increases by the employer to either of these plans would
inure to Billy's benefit. Id. at 933. Linda was also awarded a one-half interest in Billy's savings and security
plan. Id. However, Billy had withdrawn $30,000 from this plan immediately prior to the divorce, leaving only
$677.89. Id. Billy claimed that he had spent this money; but a witness testified that he had actually hidden the
money where nobody could find it. Id.
106. Id. at 934. The court stated that the spouse who contributes indirectly to the fund by way of domestic
services could have instead been working and investing his/her wages in preparation for his/her own retirement.
Id. Therefore, they concluded that "it is only equitable to allow both parties to reap the benefits of the one
existing retirement plan, to which both parties have materially contributed in some fashion. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 934.
109. Id. Finally, the court addressed Billy's contentions that it was inequitable to order him to assume the
mortgage, and that the award of $30,000 in lump sum alimony was an abuse of discretion by the chancellor. Id.
They stated that these contentions could not be addressed because the record contained insufficient evidence of
the value of the cattle operation, the thirty-three acres of real estate, or Billy's leasehold interest in the property.
Id. at 936. In addition, the court found that the chancellor failed to sufficiently explain the basis for the
$30,000 lump sum alimony award. Id.
110. Id.
11. Id.
112. Id. at 937.
113. Id. (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. Hawkins evidently disagreed with the majority opinion here and the one in Draper v. Draper, 627
So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993), because he stated that he felt that an equitable result could be achieved "by the tools a
chancellor has presently under Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988) ... [r]ather than creating - like the
Genie in Aladdin's lamp - some property right simply by being married." Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d
921, 937 (Miss. 1994) (Hawkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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it interfered with the constitutional right of a person to own and enjoy his or her
property without any government interference."'5
Justice Lee agreed only with the majority's decision to remand the case for a
re-evaluation by the chancellor.1 He disagreed with the guidelines set out by
the majority because he felt that the majority had violated the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers as well as interfered with the right of contract.117 Lee felt that the
majority opinion may have misinterpreted section 95-5-23 of the Mississippi
Code Annotated, and that this could interrupt Mississippi's statutory framework
in many areas of the law. 8
Justice Lee further criticized the majority for failing to define "marital proper-
ty."" 9 He noted that prior cases required a finding of a "material contribution"
towards the acquisition of the property by the non-titled spouse before such prop-
erty was considered "marital.""12 However, he was concerned with the fact that
the majority relegated the determination of "marital property" to the will of the
chancellor.21 In addition, Lee stated that the majority failed to confront the con-
sideration of how the "marital liabilities" should be shared, including debt-
encumbered marital assets.
22
Justice Lee believed that the majority opinion would "have a monumental
impact upon all persons in this state, wealthy and poor."123 He stated that with
the respective "needs" of the parties being an integral component of the chancel-
lor's consideration, a spouse who had never contributed to acquiring assets but
had a substantial "need" upon divorce could receive a large amount of the marital
property.
1 24
In addition, Justice Lee argued vehemently that the majority opinion was
"against public policy," and that it "discourages the marital relationship.' 25  He
stated that if the majority's guidelines were adopted, it could seriously threaten
115. Id. Hawkins stated that "[t]he right of each individual to own and enjoy property in his or her own
name, undisturbed and unfettered by any government, is a sacred right." Id. at 937-38 (citing Fitzhugh v. City
of Jackson, 97 So. 190, 192 (Miss. 1923); Miss. CONST. art. IV, § 94).
116. Id. at 938 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. Id. Lee felt that the majority opinion represented a "usurpation of legislative power because, instead of
interpreting the law, it states what the law should be - a legislative function." Id. at 940.
118. Id. Justice Lee explained that "[s]tatutes which control or affect property ownership, contractual rights,
notice requirements, trusts, wills, partnerships, taxation, and future interests ... [will] be abrogated or afflicted
to one degree or another." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. Lee continued: "[T]he majority haphazardly relegates the prior threshold requirement of finding a
'material contribution' to a mere 'consideration' for the chancellor, leaving the property which might properly
be subject to division unidentified and undefined." Id. The reason Justice Lee felt this way is likely because
the requirement of finding a material contribution is now reduced to just one of eight factors a chancellor
should consider.
122. Id. at 941.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 942. Justice Lee stated that persons who were contemplating marriage in Mississippi would sure-
ly consider the alternative of unmarried cohabitation to "avoid the interference with their lives and property
which could be caused by today's judicial legislation." Id.
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inheritance rights12 as well as the enforceability of prenuptial agreements.127
Justice Lee scorned the majority for "hastening to a decision which would cause
chaos in the lives of the citizens of Mississippi.
1 ' 28
Justice McCrae shared Justice Lee's concerns about the many ramifications of
the majority opinion. 12' He opined that the doctrine of equitable distribution
announced by the majority begged the question of just who's interests were being
protected.13 He was especially concerned that the existence of a prenuptial
agreement was not even recognized as a factor to be considered in the majority's
guidelines. 31 Justice McCrae was worried that this would allow the chancellor
to divide property which the parties intended to keep separate, if "equitable fac-
tors" so dictated. 3 2 He explained that many states had statutory provisions
which effectively safeguarded the freedom to enter into prenuptial contracts. 33
Justice McCrae was equally concerned with the effect the majority's opinion
would have on inherited property and inter vivos gifts. 34 He was concerned that
the definition of marital assets adopted by the majority, which encompassed "any
and all property accumulated or acquired during the course of the marriage,""13
could subject property inherited during the marriage to equitable distribution at
the will of the chancellor.13 Justice McCrae concluded by stating that "the
majority ha[d] winked at the constitution, usurped the power of the legislature
and devised a scheme which threatens the contract and property rights of every
citizen in Mississippi.'
1 37
2. What is "Marital" Property?
The Supreme Court of Mississippi realized that before the Ferguson guidelines
could be effectively applied by the chancery courts, it was important to define
exactly what property would be classified as "marital" and thus subject to divi-
sion at divorce. The court wasted no time. The court addressed this question on
the same day as Ferguson, in Hemsley v. Hemsley.
138
126. Id. at 941. Justice Lee believed that "[i]f the majority's guidelines were adopted, a testator or donor
might no longer be free to determine who would be the 'exclusive' beneficiary of their will or trust." Id.
127. Id. at 942. Justice Lee explained that "[e]ven the prenuptial agreements of spouses might be disregard-
ed by a chancellor according to the majority." Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (McCrae, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice McCrae agreed that the majority
violated the doctrine of separation of powers and severely impinged on the constitutional right to contract. Id.
130. Id. at 944.
131. Id. Justice McCrae cited several cases in explaining that the Supreme Court of Mississippi had long
recognized the validity of prenuptial agreements when fairly entered into. Id. (citing Stevenson v. Renardet, 35
So. 576 (Miss. 1904); Gorin v. Gorin, 38 Miss. 205 (1859)). McCrae disagreed with the majority's failure to
provide safeguards for the validity of these agreements. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 944-45 (citing Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.255(11) (West 1980)).
134. Id. at 945.
135. This definition came from Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994). Hemsley was
decided on the same day as Ferguson and is discussed infra in notes 138-164 and accompanying text.
136. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 948 (Miss. 1994) (McCrae, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice McCrae also expressed concern over the effect of the majority's opinion on business interests.
Id. at 945-46. He questioned how the majority opinion would affect preferences between secured creditors. Id.
at 946.
137. Id. at 947.
138. 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994).
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In Hemsley, the chancellor had awarded the wife, Bitsy, fifty-percent of the
retirement benefits that her husband Mike had acquired during their marriage.139
Mike agreed that the chancellor could have considered his retirement benefits in
determining the amount of alimony to be awarded. 4 ' However, he contended
that Bitsy had no property right in his retirement benefits which justified the
chancellor in divesting him of fifty percent of his interest therein.14" '
The supreme court found no merit in Mike's contention. 42 Citing Jones, the
majority held that the chancellor had the authority to order a division of the
retirement benefits since they were accumulated through the joint contributions
of the parties.'43 The court also explained that the Federal Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act 44 had vested state courts with the power to allo-
cate military retirement pay upon divorce. 4
The court then turned to the task of defining which assets were subject to divi-
sion upon divorce. 48 It explained that "[a]ssets acquired or accumulated during
the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless it can be shown
by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties' separate estates
prior to the marriage or outside the marriage."' 47 Furthermore, the court
assumed that the contributions of marital partners were of equal value whether
economic, domestic, or otherwise.'48 The majority concluded by reaffirming the
139. Id. at 9 10. Bitsy and Mike Hemsley were married in June of 1966. Id. at 911. The marriage produced
two children. Id. In the early years of their marriage, the couple lived in many different localities because of
Mike's military service. Id. However, they settled in Mississippi in 1983. Id.
Mike received a bachelor's degree in engineering in 1966. Id. He worked as an engineer officer with the
Army from 1966 until 1977. Id. While he was in the army Mike attended night classes and received a master's
degree in harbor, coastal, and ocean engineering. Id. After working in a private engineering firm for three
years, he returned to the federal government as a member of the civil service. Id.
Bitsy worked either full-time or part-time during the marriage to help support the family. Id. She had a high
school education. Id. At the time of the couple's separation in April of 1991, Bitsy was earning approximately
$22,000 per year as a secretary. Id. Mike was earning approximately $70,000 per year. Id. at 913. Soon after
their separation, the couple received a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Id. at 911.
The chancellor awarded Bitsy periodic alimony, fifty percent (50%) of Mike's military retirement, and fifty
percent (50%) of Mike's civil service retirement as of the date of the judgment. Id.
140. Id. at 912.
141. Id. at 913.
142. Id. at 914.
143. Id. (citing Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1988); Watts v. Watts, 466 So. 2d 889, 891
(Miss. 1985)). See also Brendel v. Brendel, 566 So. 2d 1269, 1273 (Miss. 1990); Regan v. Regan, 507 So. 2d
54 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. Clark, 293 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1974).
144. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 1992). FUSFSPA does not vest rights in anyone, but merely allows the
states to treat the military retirement pensions of their citizens as property subject to state property laws.
Brown v. Brown, 574 So. 2d 688, 690-91 (Miss. 1990).
145. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss. 1994).
146. Id.
147. Id. Prior to Hemsley, a spouse had to prove that he or she contributed to the acquisition of an asset
titled in the name of the other spouse in order to receive an interest therein. See Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d
302 (1993); Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1988); Watts, 466 So. 2d at 889. However, this definition of
marital property espoused in Hemsley seems to create a presumption of equal contribution which can only be
rebutted by proof that the property is attributable to one of the parties' separate estates prior to marriage.
Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 914.
148. Id. at 915.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:2
Ferguson guidelines'49 for chancellors to follow in arriving at an equitable distri-
bution.5
The Ferguson dissenters1 51 were also upset with the majority opinion in
Hemsley. 52 Chief Justice Hawkins dissented as to the court's definition of "mar-
ital property."' 3 He felt that lump-sum alimony was a sufficient tool to award a
wife for her contributions to the marriage,1 54 and he was disturbed by the majori-
ty's creation of a property right in each spouse solely because of the marriage.
55
He believed that the majority diminished a person's sacred right to own proper-
ty.156 He feared that this "judicially-created property right" upon divorce would
expand to other areas of the law such as will contests and the distribution of
estates.57
In his dissenting opinion, Justice McCrae sharply criticized the majority's defi-
nition of marital property.158 He stated that the court went too far when it created
a presumption that all property acquired during the marriage was subject to equi-
table distribution unless there was proof that the asset came from one spouse's
separate estate.5 9  He also disagreed with the majority's presumption that the
partners contributed equally to the marriage, whether such contributions were
domestic or economic.
60
Justice McCrae further explained that the majority opinion left open too many
questions.1"' He cited an Arkansas statute which set forth seven exceptions to the
149. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
150. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 915. The court also noted that the chancellor ordered Bitsy's alimony to be
reduced by her share of Mike's retirement benefits once they start to receive those benefits. Id. Periodic alimo-
ny awards are always subject to modification when circumstances require. See supra note 3. Therefore, the
chancellor was just trying to foster administrative convenience and save the parties from having to petition the
court for a modification once Mike's benefits began being dispersed.
151. In Ferguson, Chief Justice Hawkins, Justice McCrae, and Justice Lee each dissented to most of the
majority opinion. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 937.
152. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 916.
153. Id. (Hawkins, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154. Id. Hawkins once again expressed his agreement with the Ferguson factors, but stated that the chancel-
lor should consider them when making a lump-sum award. Id.
155. Id. Hawkins stated that parties should be free to put all of their assets acquired during the marriage in
their joint names, but that "[t]hey also ought to be free not to." Id.
156. Id Hawkins explained that everyone has a sacred right to own property in their individual names,
whether married or not, and that the majority opinion disparages that right. Id. He also felt that the court
lacked the constitutional authority to create such a right. Id.
157. Id. Justice Hawkins stated that "it will take but a slight turn of the screw to expand the assertion of this
property right." Id. Therefore, he felt that such a far-reaching change in the right to own property is best left to
the legislature. Id.
158. Id. at 918 (McCrac, J., dissenting). Justice McCrae explained that the majority's definition of marital
property was "too all-encompassing and fail[ed] to consider the nature of the assets to be distributed." Id.
159. Id. Justice McCrae interpreted the majority's definition of marital property as including property
acquired by gift or devise, regardless of title or proof that it was intended to be passed only to one spouse. Id.
160. Id. at 919. Justice McCrae interpreted the majority opinion as saying that "regardless of what the evi-
dence might show, the chancellor is to assume there has been a fifty-fifty contribution to the assets of the mar-
riage." Id. He interpreted this as an irrebuttable presumption. Id.
161. Some of the questions McCrae mentioned were:
1) How would parties substantiate that they acquired an asset before marriage?
2) Can an asset change in character from "separate" to marital?
3) What character would rental payments from property acquired before marriage take?
4) How does indebtedness fit into the definition of marital assets?
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presumption that all property acquired during marriage was marital property. 162
He stated that this method better accounted for the "realities of modern mar-
riage."' Justice McCrae concluded by criticizing the majority for leaving the
"public, bench, and bar in a quandary over the definition of marital property and
matters governing its disposition upon divorce.""1 4
3. Questions Left Open
The Supreme Court of Mississippi had come a long way in a short time in its
implementation of the doctrine of equitable distribution. The abandonment of
the title theory16 and the Hemsley presumption that homemaker services were of
equal value to breadwinner services 166 were just a few examples of the positive
changes the court had made. Several subsequent cases confirmed these
changes,167 and by October of 1994 all of the Justices on the court had either
accepted or acquiesced in the Ferguson factors.166  However, many questions
were left open. The character of inherited property or inter vivos gifts between
the spouses, and the enforceability of antenuptial agreements were some of the
issues still to be faced.16 9 The court addressed one of these issues, the enforce-
ability of antenuptial contracts under the new doctrine of equitable distribution,
just five months after Ferguson and Hemsley, in Smith v. Smith. 7
Billy and Zena Smith were married in April of 1985171 when they were each in
their mid-fifties. 72 They each had previous marriages and children by their for-
mer spouses. 3 In contemplation of their marriage, they entered into an antenup-
162. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-315 (1993) provides as follows:
(b) For the purpose of this section, "marital property" means all property acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired prior to marriage, or by gift, or by bequest, or by devise, or by descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent;
(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of divorce from bed and board;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to marriage or by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent, or in exchange therefor;
(6) Benefits received or to be received from a workers' compensation claim, personal injury claim,
or social security claim when those benefits are for any degree of permanent disability or future
medical expenses; and
(7) Income from property owned prior to the marriage, or from property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent, or in exchange therefor.
163. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 918 (McCrae, J., dissenting). Some of the characteristics of
modem marriage that Justice McCrae mentioned were that more couples are entering marriages with separate
assets, more couples are marrying later in life, and it is more common to see both spouses work. Id.
164. Id. at 921. Justice Lee also wrote a short dissenting opinion which agreed with the dissenting opinions
of Justice McCrae and Chief Justice Hawkins. Id. at 918 (Lee, J., dissenting).
165. Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
166. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 at 914.
167. See Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d 523 (Miss. 1994); Parker v. Parker, 641 So. 2d 1133 (Miss. 1994).
168. See Pierce, 648 So. 2d at 529-30.
169. See Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 919-20 (McCrae, J., dissenting).
170. 656 So. 2d 1143 (Miss. 1995).
171. Id. at 1145. Zena had worked in a garment plant for 40 years, and continued to work there after her
marriage to Billy. Id. In addition, during the marriage she often helped Billy in his truck farming business and
sold vegetables for Billy from her vehicle at work. Id. Furthermore, Zena helped Billy with personal care of
two of his elderly relatives, and added Billy to her health insurance plan at a cost of $100.00 per month. Id.
172. Id. at 1146.
173. Id. at 1145.
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tial agreement in which each spouse relinquished any claims to the other's assets
owned prior to the marriage.
174
Billy had a savings account consisting of nonmarital funds with Zena autho-
rized to make withdrawals from the account. 17' However, soon after the couple's
separation in 1991, Zena withdrew $38,500 from the joint savings account to
support herself.17' Billy filed for a temporary restraining order [hereinafter TRO]
which the chancery court granted, ordering Zena to return the money to his
account. 77 Zena redeposited approximately $32,500 of the $38,500.178 Billy
then filed for divorce, and Zena counterclaimed for separate maintenance. 7 '
The chancellor dismissed Billy's claim for divorce and Zena's claim for sepa-
rate maintenance. 8 ° In addition, the chancellor reversed the effect of the TRO
and ordered the $32,500 returned to Zena. 8' The chancellor did not order a divi-
sion of property, but simply found that the TRO was unwarranted because Zena
had acted within her authority in withdrawing funds from the account.
82
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, under the pen of Justice Prather, began by
discussing the history of antenuptial agreements, and explained that in earlier
times these agreements were considered void as contrary to public policy.'83
However, the court explained that by 1984 the majority of courts had abandoned
the view that such contracts were void ab initio.8 4 Citing Stevenson v.
Renardet,"'8 the court noted that antenuptial agreements were fully enforceable in
Mississippi. 8 However, the majority explained that Mississippi imposed a
requirement of fairness, including a duty of disclosure, in the execution of these
174. Id. The antenuptial agreement provided, in pertinent part, that both parties would have "full, complete
and absolute control and management of all [his/her] property ... [by] sale, inter vivos gift ... so that all of
[his/her] said property shall be disposed of as [she/he] alone desires." Id.
175. Id.






182. Id. The chancellor's findings of fact were as follows:
Zena was "entitled to withdraw the $32,500" from the joint savings account; the monies deposited in
the account were ... Billy's inheritance ... ; Billy had not made a gift of these funds to Zena, but
had "placed the funds in a joint account to enable Zena to write checks on the account."
Id.
183. Id. (citing Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Mass. 1981)).
184. Id. (citing Frey v. Frey, 471 A.2d 705, 709 (Md. 1984); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970)).
185. 25 So. 576 (Miss. 1904).
186. Smith v. Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143, 1147 (Miss. 1995).
187. Id. (citing Hensley v. Hensley, 524 So. 2d 325, 327-28 (Miss. 1988)).
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing ANN OLDFATHER ET. AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 4.05 at 4-42
(1994 ed.)).
190. Id. at 1147.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1146.
193. Id. at 1147. Therefore, the court found that Zena was acting within her authority when she withdrew
the $38,500. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1144.
196. Id. at 1148.
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agreements. 187
Justice Prather noted that, generally, antenuptial agreements are only enforce-
able upon death or divorce.188 She pointed out that some legal observers have
recognized that the breach of an antenuptial agreement can lead to appropriate
remedies even before a divorce,189 however, she declined to follow suit in the
case at bar.190 Furthermore, the majority explained that the primary considera-
tion, as in any other contract, should be the parties' intent.1 91
Billy first contended that the chancellor erred in granting Zena an interest in
the savings account consisting of his inheritance.1 92 The majority explained that
the chancellor had not granted Zena any interest in the joint account, but that he
had simply found that Billy granted Zena the right to withdraw funds by estab-
lishing the joint account.193 Since the chancellor denied the divorce, the court
held he was without authority to order a division of the marital property.194
Billy's remaining contentions all dealt with the division of property pursuant to
the antenuptial agreement. 9  The majority rejected these contentions by reiterat-
ing that the chancellor had not ordered a division of property, but had simply
found that Zena had the authority to withdraw funds from the account.19 The
majority concluded by explaining that the chancellor could only address the
antenuptial agreement upon divorce.' 97
Not to spoil what had become a tradition in marital property division cases
since Draper, Justices McCrae and Lee dissented.1 98 Both Justices agreed that
the language in the antenuptial agreement clearly expressed the parties' intent for
the agreement to take immediate effect.199 They opined that the majority erred
by holding that the antenuptial agreement could not be addressed until divorce.
200
The Supreme Court of Mississippi attempted to clarify Hemsley's distinction
197. Id. The Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that upon divorce the chancery court can consider the
antenuptial agreement, any inter-spousal transfers of separate property during the marriage, any inherited prop-
erty, the dissipation or appreciation of property, or "any other applicable factors to arrive at a fair division of
marital assets." Id. at 1147. The court did not provide guidelines for the chancellor to follow in making these
considerations, nor did they give examples of "any other applicable factors." Id.
198. See Pierce v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d 523 (Miss. 1994); Parker v. Parker, 641 So. 2d 1133 (Miss. 1994);
Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994); and of
course Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
199. Smith v. Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143, 1149 (Miss. 1995).
200. Id. Justice McCrae stated that the chancellor had erred by reversing the effect of the temporary
restraining order and awarding Zena $32,500. Id. at 1148-49. He explained that, in doing so, the chancellor
had ignored the terms of the antenuptial agreement. Id.
Justice McCrae explained that the intent of the parties should be the controlling factor in antenuptial agree-
ments, and that the Smiths clearly relinquished their right to each other's property acquired before the marriage.
Id. Justice McCrae further stated that the money withdrawn by Zena was part of Billy's inheritance, and that
the chancellor had no right to repudiate the contract and award Zena the money. Id.
Justice McCrae believed that the chancellor had no authority to award Zena a judgment of $32,500. Id. He
disagreed with the majority's contention that the chancellor merely found that Zena was authorized to withdraw
the money from the joint account. Id. Justice McCrae explained that the chancellor had clearly awarded Zena
an interest in the joint account. Id. He included part of the chancellor's order which went as follows: "THE
COURT DOES FIND, AND IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the savings account at Security Savings
Association is a joint account, and the defendant, Zena Faye Phillips Smith, is hereby granted thirty-two thou-
sand, five hundred dollars ($32,500) of those sums in that account." Id. at 1148. He also stated that the lan-
guage in the Smith's antenuptial agreement gave the agreement full force and effect during marriage, not just in
the event of a divorce. Id. Justice McCrac concluded by stating that "the majority should ... seek to protect
the sanctity of such contracts... during marriage and in the event of divorce." Id. at 1149.
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between marital and nonmarital property on the same day as Smith, in Johnson v.
Johnson."1
IV THE INSTANT CASE
With Justice Prather at the helm, Johnson v. Johnson provided much-needed
guidance on what constituted "marital property," the title given by Hemsley to
property subject to equitable distribution." 2 In a near-unanimous opinion,0 3 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi looked to other jurisdictions to help eliminate
some of the legitimate concerns that had been expressed in recent dissenting
opinions.
2 4
After explaining the standard of review in domestic relations matters 205
Justice Prather turned to the merits of the case.20 8 Wayne first contended that the
chancellor erred in awarding Jane a one-half interest of the present value in his
retirement plan, his savings plan, and his employee stock ownership plan.20 7
Citing Hemsley, the court stated that Jane's domestic contributions are assumed
to be equally as valuable as the contributions made by Wayne toward his pension
and savings plans. 20 ' Therefore, the court rejected Wayne's contention and held
that his retirement and savings plan were presumptively part of the marital estate
subject to equitable distribution.20 9
The majority next responded to Jane's contention that the assets she had inher-
ited during the marriage constituted "nonmarital property," and were not subject
to equitable distribution. 21  The court agreed that "property clearly obtained by
one party through inheritance or acquired by one party by gift is nonmarital
property not subject to equitable distribution. ' 21' Therefore, Jane initially
rebutted the Hemsley presumption that these assets were marital property.
1 2
Since Wayne offered no proof to the contrary, the court explained, Jane's inherit-
201. 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994).
202. Id.
203. Justice Lee concurred in the results only.
204. Id. at 1286 n.2.
205. Id. at 1285. The court explained that the "scope of review in domestic relations matters is limited
under the familiar rule that this Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong, clearly
erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard." Id. (citing McEwen v. McEwen, 631 So.
2d 821, 823 (Miss. 1994)). See supra part III.A.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1285-86.
209. Id. at 1285. Hemsley created a presumption that all property acquired during the marriage was jointly
accumulated by the husband and wife. Id. at 1285-86. To rebut this presumption with regard to an asset, it
must be shown "that such asset is attributable to one of the parties' separate estates prior to the marriage or out-
side the marriage." Id. at 1285 (citing Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914, 915 (Miss. 1994)).
210. Id. at 1286.
211. Id. at 1286 n.2 (citing Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss. 1994)). The court stated that
this comports with other equitable distribution states which distinguish these types of property from "marital
property." Id. (citing Hussey v. Hussey, 312 S.E.2d 267, 270 (S.C. 1984) (holding that inherited property is not
part of the marital estate which is subject to equitable distribution); and Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407, 410
n.3 (Va. 1987) (holding that gift property is not part of the marital estate subject to equitable distribution)).
212. ld. at 1286. In order to rebut the Hemsley presumption (that all property obtained during marriage is
jointly accumulated and subject to equitable distribution), Jane had to show that her inheritance was attributable
to her separate estate prior to the marriage or outside the marriage. Id.
DEFINING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
ed property was "nonmarital" and not subject to equitable distribution.21
When nonmarital property is commingled with marital property, Justice
Prather explained, it may lose its nonmarital character.214 Jane had allowed
$153,000 of her nonmarital property215 to be used for the benefit of the entire
family.216 In addition, Wayne had returned $66,000 of this amount to Jane's non-
marital estate.217 The court held that when the $153,000 was commingled with
the joint marital estate, it lost its nonmarital character and became subject to
equitable distribution.218 However, the majority explained that the $66,000
which Wayne returned to Jane "reacquired its nonmarital character by virtue of
Wayne's actions."21
The court also addressed the issue of how indebtedness of a married couple
fits into the division of property upon divorce.2 ' Wayne had incurred a
$142,000 debt as a result of medical expenses for the couple's oldest child.221
The majority explained that since this debt affected Wayne's income, thus impli-
cating a Ferguson factor,z2 it must be considered in equitably distributing the
marital property.
223
The court attempted to provide a framework for chancellors to follow when
dividing marital property pursuant to Hemsley and Ferguson.224 In addition, the
framework was developed to help chancellors in determining the necessity for
collateral awards of alimony in light of the newly adopted doctrine of equitable
distribution.225
Justice Prather explained that the first step is to determine the character of the
parties' assets, "marital" or "nonmarital," pursuant to Hemsley.22' Next, she stat-
ed, the chancellor should equitably divide the "marital" property pursuant to the
Ferguson guidelines.227 If this division will, in combination with each party's
nonmarital assets, adequately provide for both parties, the chancellor need not go
further z. 22  However, if one party is left with a deficit after the property is divid-
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. This $153,000 came from the sale of timber which Jane had inherited. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Nelson v. Nelson, 611 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Ala. 1992)). Nelson, an Alabama case, held that
"commingled funds are marital assets subject to equitable distribution." Id.
219. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 1994).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. See Ferguson guideline number 7, supra note 97.
223. Id. The court stated that indebtedness should be considered when dividing the property, but apparently
left to the chancellor the task of determining how to factor indebtedness into the picture. Id.
224. Id. at 1287.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. The nonmarital property stays vested in its owner. Id.
228 Id
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ed, then alimony should be considered.229 In addition, the court repeated, this
process does not require the divestiture of gifts or inheritances.23° In conclusion,
Justice Prather urged chancellors to provide a record which clearly reflects the
factors considered in reaching their decisions.231
V ANALYSIS
The Mississippi Supreme Court has gone to great lengths in creating a fair sys-
tem of dividing marital property upon divorce. Frequent dissenting opinions
have illustrated the sensitivity and overwhelming importance of this area of the
law.232 The most significant of the recent changes is the supreme court's recogni-
tion that homemaker services are a sufficient contribution toward a marital estate
to justify the divestiture of title from the title-holding spouse.
2 33
A. Recognizing the Value of
Homemaker Contributions to a Marriage
Mississippi did not become a true equitable distribution state until 1993, when
Draper abandoned the title theory. This is because until then the Supreme Court
of Mississippi failed to recognize "homemaker contributions" as a sufficient
contribution to the acquisition of a family's assets to justify the divestiture of title
from the wage-earning spouse. 234 The court failed to recognize this even though
many times the homemaker spouse was encouraged by the wage-earning spouse
to stay home and take care of the children. This approach definitely ignored the
very essence of the doctrine of equitable distribution: that the distribution be
229. Id. Ferguson specifically stated that the doctrine of equitable distribution did not alter the law regard-
ing alimony. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994). However, Ferguson also stated that one
of the goals of equitable distribution is to finalize the division of assets, and conclude the parties' legal relation-
ship. Id.
By considering all of the property division issues first, as the Johnson framework requires, courts will be
better able to accomplish a termination of the parties' legal relationship. However, the court failed to state
whether the alimony awards are still determined pursuant to Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1282
(Miss. 1993). See supra note 3.
230. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Miss. 1994).
23 1. Id. The court also addressed Wayne's contention that the award of child support was excessive. Id.
The court stated that chancellors should follow the child support guidelines found in Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-19-
101(1) (1972). Id. The court further explained that a chancellor can only depart from these guidelines with
written findings of why they are inappropriate. Id. at 1288 (citing McEahern v. McEahem, 605 So. 2d 809,
813-14 (Miss. 1992)). It was also explained that the chancellor erred by departing from the guidelines without
a written justification. Id.
In addition, the court addressed the chancellor's decision to give Wayne an option, upon the children's reach-
ing their majority, to discontinue making monthly payments on the home and deed his one-half interest to Jane.
Id. In light of the fact that the chancellor could have made this divestiture mandatory, the court declined to
state that the optional divestiture was error. Id. The court also found that the chancellor erred in awarding Jane
$5,000 in attorney's fees, because there was no finding that Jane was unable to pay them. Id. The court con-
cluded by remanding the entire case for a "redetermination not inconsistent with this opinion." Id. at 1289.
232. See Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994); Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss.
1994); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994); Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302 (Miss. 1993).
233. See Draper, 627 So. 2d at 306.
234. In regard to the contributions required by a spouse in order to effectuate a divestment of title, Draper
stated: "It is sufficient contribution if one party renders services generally regarded as domestic in nature." Id.
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equitable.23 In fact, Mississippi's adherence to the title theory for nearly ten
years longer than any other state offended equity.
Mississippi courts often worked around the title theory by awarding the non-
title holding spouse alimony in the form of a lump-sum settlement, reflecting
that spouse's share in the jointly accumulated assets.236 However, no justification
remained for allowing a chancellor to "reach deeply into a man's pocketbook,"
but not allowing the chancellor to touch his property.237 This is especially true
because, as a practical matter, the title-holding spouse often had to sell the prop-
erty to be able to afford the lump-sum alimony.238 No reason existed for allowing
one spouse to retain all of the future benefits of a family investment while the
other spouse was relegated to being "bought off" with a cash award.239
Due to the changing position of women in society and the enlightenment of
people in general, there was no justification left for the rule that homemaker con-
tributions did not justify an equitable division of property.240 Oliver Wendell
Holmes said it best:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imi-
tation of the past.24'
The title theory was such a rule. The State of Mississippi blindly imitated the
past for many years longer than any other state in the union.242
Draper finally recognized that the domestic services of the wife could be ade-
quate to justify her receipt of an equitable interest in property titled in the name
of her husband.2 43  This was likely sweet music to the ears of women in
Mississippi - women who had spent years raising the children, cooking the food,
cleaning the home, empathizing with their husbands' hard days at work, keeping
track of the family's finances, etc., and in so doing, had foregone their own
235. Though impossible to precisely define, equitable distribution basically refers to the authority of the
courts to order a transfer of property from the title holder to his or her spouse. Lee R. Russ, Annotation,
Divorce: Equitable Distribution Doctrine, 41 A.L.R. 4th 481, 484 (1985). In addition, the doctrine recognizes
a homemaker's contribution to the acquisition of the marital estate. Id. Therefore, any remnants of the title the-
ory which remained before Draper kept Mississippi out of the arena of equitable distribution.
236. See, e.g., Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So. 2d 1300 (Miss. 1982); Clark v. Clark, 293 So. 2d 447 (Miss. 1974).
See also supra note 2.
237. Jones v. Jones, 532 So. 2d 574, 581 (Miss. 1988) (Prather, J., concurring).
238. Id. at 582. See also Reeves, 410 So. 2d at 1300.
239. For instance, if the husband owns a business which he built during the marriage, the wife should share
in the future profits of the business instead of being awarded a lump-sum alimony award. See infra note 249
discussing how alimony awards frequently go unpaid.
240. Jones, 532 So. 2d at 583 (Prather, J., concurring). Justice Prather explained that there was no good rea-
son for "why Mississippi clings to these last vestiges of the title rule." Id. She explained that the reasons given
for maintaining the title theory were to maintain the stability in real estate titles and to protect lienholders'
rights. Id. These reasons, she further explained, held no validity because "no equitable distribution rule could
ever alter, change, or modify lienholders' priorities." Id.
241. Id. at 584 (quoting 0. W Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARy. L. RE. 457, 469 (1897)).
242. Id. at 583. Mississippi was the final adherent to the title theory. Id. The final states to abandon the
title theory prior to Mississippi were New York and Pennsylvania in 1980, South Carolina in 1982, and West
Virginia in 1983. See JOHN MCCAHEY, VALUATION AND DISTRItBUnON OF MARITAL PROPERTY § 3.01 (1988).
Mississippi finally abandoned the title theory in 1993. See Draper v. Draper, 627 So. 2d 302, 305 (Miss. 1993).
243. Draper, 627 So. 2d at 306.
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opportunities for education and success in the work-place. Subsequent cases
have agreed with Draper.44 Allowing adequate compensation for the services
rendered by these women signaled the court's realization that homemaker ser-
vices have legitimate, compensable economic value,24 which should be account-
ed for upon divorce. These women could now at least be confident that they
would get something of value to help them survive instead of just an award of
lump-sum alimony, of which a penny is too-often never seen.246
The reliance of courts on lump-sum alimony as the means of distributing the
marital property upon divorce ignores the realities of the epidemic of non-pay-
ment. 47 Chancellors should take care of a spouse who served as a homemaker
by awarding that spouse property, whenever possible, instead of alimony. Even
an unsecured creditor, upon his debtor's bankruptcy, would not envy a woman
sitting on the porch waiting for the mailman on the day her alimony is supposed
to arrive.248 By awarding the homemaker property that is before the court for
division, a chancellor can effectively eliminate any problems caused by the non-
payment of alimony.249 This is the classic example of a bird in the hand (receipt
of a portion of the property at present) being worth several in the bush (the
uncertain receipt of alimony in the future).2"'
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not stop with the abandonment of the title
theory. The court continued in providing protection for homemakers in Hemsley.
Hemsley's creation of a presumption of equal contribution to assets acquired dur-
ing the marriage was a monumental step in Mississippi domestic relations law. It
represented a valiant attempt by the court to prevent any possibility that a chan-
cellor would use his or her discretion to undervalue a wife's domestic contribu-
tions to a marriage. No longer would a spouse who made significant homemaker
244. See Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994); Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 934
(Miss. 1994); Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994).
245. There have been persistent attempts made to put a monetary value on homemaker contributions. See
Nancy R. Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occupations, 17 FAM. L.Q. 41
(1983). Estimates of the value of such contributions have been as high as $40,000 per year. See Ferguson, 639
So. 2d at 926 n.2. In addition, as Justice Prather explained in the context of a pension plan:
When one spouse has contributed directly to the fund, by virtue of his/her labor, while the other has
contributed indirectly, by virtue of domestic services and/or earned income which both parties have
enjoyed rather than invested, the spouse without retirement funds in his/her own name could instead
have been working outside the home and/or investing his/her wages in preparation for his/her own
retirement. When separate plans for each spouse are not in existence, it is only equitable to allow
both parties to reap the benefits of the one existing retirement plan, to which both parties have mate-
rially contributed in some fashion.
Id. at 934.
246. Court ordered alimony awards frequently go unpaid, leaving women in desperate circumstances.
LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 328 (W Va. 1983) (Neely, J., concurring). Statistics have shown that 28.4
percent of women entitled to receive alimony do not receive the full amount, and 30.5 percent of these women
receive nothing at all. Id.
247. Id. at 329.
248. Other statistics support the proposition that alimony is a less attractive alternative to women today:
10.3 percent of single male parents fall below the poverty line while 34.6 percent of single female parents fall
below this line. Id. at 328. In addition, divorced women with children now constitute a new class of the pover-
ty-stricken. Id.
249. Hopefully, this will prevent the use of lump-sum alimony awards as a substitute for an equitable divi-
sion of the property. By awarding the wife a portion of the "marital" property the court has before it, the chan-
cellor can best assure that she will be provided for in the future. It is better for society in general for the wife to
have an interest in the family business and the small stream of income it produces than for her to receive her
share in lump-sum alimony, the receipt of which is speculative in comparison.
250. Id. at 330.
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contributions to a marriage be punished by receiving an inequitable amount of
the family's assets upon divorce, solely because she rendered her contributions
outside the marketplace.
B. How to Rebut the Hemsley Presumption
Under Johnson v. Johnson
Another important step in Mississippi domestic relations law was Johnson's
holding that the Hemsley presumption was rebuttable.251 Although Johnson did
not explain exactly what will rebut the Hemsley presumption, it unequivocally
stated that it could be done."' The court specifically stated that inherited and
gift-acquired property would rebut the presumption upon a proper showing as
long as that property had not been commingled with the family assets. 3 In
addition, Johnson placed the burden of proof ofn the party claiming that the prop-
erty was his or her "nonmarital"2 4 property.25 The cases suggest several other
situations in which the Hemsley presumption may be rebutted.
One way a party can likely rebut the presumption is by showing his or her
spouse did absolutely nothing to contribute to the marriage. In determining
whether a spouse has made a "substantial" contribution to the accumulation of
the family's assets, Ferguson guideline number one directs chancellors to consid-
er such spouse's contribution to the economic and emotional well-being of the
family unit.256 However, Hemsley removed any requirement of an economic con-
tribution, explicitly finding that domestic services were sufficient.2 7  Therefore,
a spouse who served as a homemaker and successfully raised two children in a
twenty year marriage will likely be entitled to a good portion of the marital prop-
erty upon divorce. On the other hand, a spouse who spends twenty years of a
marriage sitting in front of the television while his or her partner maintains a job
and pays the bills is leaning on a slender reed. 58
251. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281 (Miss. 1994).
252. Id. at 1286.
253. Id.
254. "Nonmarital" was the label given by Johnson to property that is the parties' separate property and is
not subject to division with the other spouse upon divorce. Id.
255. Id. The court explained that Mrs. Johnson initially rebutted the presumption that her inheritance was
"marital" property subject to equitable distribution. Id.
256. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
257. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994). The court stated: "We, today, recognize that
marital partners can be equal contributors whether or not they both are at work in the market place." Id.
258. Community property jurisdictions generally require a fifty-fifty split of a couple's property upon
divorce. Equitable distribution allows a chancellor to avoid the unjust results that the community property sys-
tem often causes by examining the history of the marriage and the relative contributions of each spouse, and
reaching a settlement which best reflects the parties' respective contributions. See Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637
So. 2d 850 (Miss. 1994). The court explained in Chamblee that:
The contrast between community property and equitable division is clear: in the former one must
conform to a strict intransigent rule which has little consideration for the realities of each individual
case while in the latter one has the flexibility to do what equity and justice requires. It is the opinion
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Another way that the Hemsley presumption can be rebutted is by a valid
prenuptial agreement. 59 This concept was reaffirmed in Smith v. Smith.26
However, under Smith, just as in the inheritance context, for spouses to commin-
gle assets covered by a prenuptial agreement is ill-advised.261 In addition, the
court will generally only enforce such agreements at death or divorce.21 2 One
lesson to be learned from the recent cases is that spouses should keep their non-
marital property separate and distinct from any jointly-owned property if they
want such property to be exempt from distribution at the time of divorce."
Another possible way for a spouse to rebut the Hemsley presumption is by
proving that the property was an inter-spousal gift.264 However, this issue has not
yet been addressed by the court in light of the new doctrine of equitable distribu-
tion. It has been suggested that the character of an inter-spousal gift may depend
on whether the gift is a highly-personalized one, such as a piece of jewelry, or
whether it is a more impersonal type of gift, such as a living-room set.265
Impersonal gifts, as Ferguson suggested, are more likely to be considered "mari-
tal" property subject to equitable distribution.2 6
By creating a presumption of equal contribution, Hemsley helped assure that
chancellors would not wield their discretion in a gender-based fashion. However,
as illustrated above, the presumption could result in an injustice in situations
such as that in which one spouse receives an inheritance during the marriage.
Therefore, by holding that the presumption is rebuttable, Johnson gave chancel-
lors the flexibility to achieve the fairness that a strict presumption would likely
have prohibited in some situations.
C. Issues Left Unresolved
Foremost of the questions left open is: What has to be shown to rebut the
Hemsley presumption that the parties contributed equally to the acquisition of
any property accumulated during the marriage?2 67 This is especially important
when one spouse claims that certain property is his or her nonmarital property
and the other party contests that fact. The Johnson Court did not have the occa-
sion to address the evidence necessary to rebut the Hemsley presumption because
the husband there did not dispute the nonmarital character of the wife's assets.2"
What should a married person do to prevent his or her spouse from successful-
ly disputing the nonmarital character of his or her property? Since the initial
burden of proof is on the party claiming that the particular asset is his or her non-
marital property,2 69 it is likely a good idea for a party to build and maintain a
259. See Smith v. Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143 (Miss. 1995).
260. Id.
261. Id. In Smith, the court seemed to find that Mr. Smith's bank account, even though it consisted of his
inheritance, became a marital asset once he put Mrs. Smith's name on the bank account. Id. at 1147.
262. Id.
263. See Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 1994).
264. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994).
265. Id. (citing LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 335-36 (W. Va. 1983) (Neely, J., concurring)).
266. Id.
267. See Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994).
268. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 1994).
269. Id.
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"paper trail" which fully documents the source of such property. In some cir-
cumstances, even documentation of the source of the asset may be misleading.
One such occasion would be when a parent leaves his or her child a piece of
property in a will with the intent that the property be shared equally with the
child's spouse. If the parent leaves the property in the name of his or her adult-
child and fails to express his or her intent that the property be shared equally
with the child's spouse, the child may be able to receive the property in its entire-
ty upon divorce,270 even though it is in direct contravention of the parent's intent.
This sends a message to Mississippians to fully express their intent when leaving
someone property in a will.
What actions are necessary to prevent one's nonmarital property from becom-
ing commingled with the marital property and subject to division at divorce?
Clearly, when one spouse uses money derived from his or her inheritance for the
benefit of the family, such money loses its nonmarital character."' Smith indi-
cates that even including the name of one's spouse on a bank account for conve-
nience can change the character of the inherited money in the account from non-
marital to marital.272 Therefore, a party who does not want his or her nonmarital
property to be subject to division at divorce should go to great lengths to keep
such property separate and distinct from his or her spouse.
Another issue that remains unresolved is when a prenuptial agreement should
be given effect. The majority in Smith held that the prenuptial agreement at issue
there could only be recognized at the dissolution of the marriage or the death of
one of the parties.2  However, the court there seemed to confuse prenuptial
agreements, which the majority explained were "enforceable like any other con-
tract," with property division, which a chancellor only has the authority to order
upon divorce.27 4 Therefore, until the court rules further on the enforceability of
prenuptial agreements parties should expressly state that any such agreement
shall take immediate effect, but even this may be insufficient. Until the Supreme
Court of Mississippi gives immediate operative effect to prenuptial agreements,
such agreements are of little use in protecting one's nonmarital property. Could
the court's failure to give strength to such agreements discourage some of the
many marriages that people would otherwise enter into later in life when they
have already acquired substantial assets through their own individual efforts?
The court's holding in Smith, insofar as it failed to give the prenuptial agreement
there the same effect as any other contract, discourages the marital relationship
and violates public policy.
270. If the parents leave property to their child (and in that child's name) in a will, it would be difficult for
that child's spouse to prove that the parents intended for the child to share the property equally with the spouse.
Therefore, unless the inheriting child voluntarily disclosed that the parent intended the spouse to share in the
property, the spouse would have a difficult time proving the parent's intent.
271. Johnson, 650 So. 2d at 1286.
272. Smith v. Smith, 656 So. 2d 1143, 1145-46 (Miss. 1995).
273. Id. at 1147-48.
274. When a court is interpreting a contract, its goal should be to give effect to the intent of the parties.
Therefore, if the parties intended for their prenuptial agreement to take immediate effect, as the parties in Smith
did, the court has no authority to enforce the contract only at death or divorce. Enforcing an antenuptial agree-
ment is an entirely separate issue from property division, which the Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently
held can only be effected upon divorce. See, e.g., Gardner v. Gardner, 618 So. 2d 108, 115 (Miss. 1993);
Thompson v. Thompson, 527 So. 2d 617, 623 (Miss. 1988).
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Several other unanswered questions remain regarding the classification of
property as marital or nonmarital: What is the character of property received in
exchange for nonmarital property? What is the character of money acquired by
the sale of nonmarital property? If the money is nonmarital, what type of money
came from the sale of one's inheritance or other nonmarital property? Is the
increase in value of one's nonmarital property during the marriage subject to
division upon divorce? What is the character of benefits received from worker's
compensation, personal injury, or social security claims? The Mississippi
Supreme Court will likely address these and other questions in the near future as
the doctrine of equitable distribution continues to take shape in Mississippi.
Although the general principles of the new doctrine of equitable distribution
seem to be in place, the implementation and refinement of those principles is a
different matter. In some cases, such as Ferguson, the court appears to have
over-hastily addressed issues that were not before it.27 However, most of this
was likely done for the benefit of chancellors until the court has time to further
define this doctrine through case law. It is important to note that the advisory
portions of the opinions, such as the Ferguson guidelines, likely do not have the
precedential value of the court's treatment of the factual pattern then before it.
However, in due time, cases will fill in the gaps. Therefore, practitioners should
be careful not to read too much into the opinions. In addition, lawyers should
not be afraid to look to other jurisdictions to assist the court (and their clients) in
this ongoing developmental process.27
VI. CONCLUSION
Due to the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent decisions regarding marital
property division, Mississippi's homemakers can sleep better at night. The
supreme court's abolition of the title theory set the stage for the development of
the doctrine of equitable distribution, and the court proceeded at break-neck
speed. In addition, the Hemsley Court finally recognized the value of the contri-
butions of a homemaker, who may have sacrificed his or her own career potential
for the sake of the other spouse.
Johnson served to eliminate some of the concerns that the Hemsley presump-
tion brought about by explaining that the presumption was rebuttable. Though
this rebuttable presumption will likely be the subject of much future litigation, it
will help protect a person's inheritance, inter vivos gifts, and similar types of
property from being subject to division upon divorce. The recent changes in this
area better account for the realities of modem marriage and the changed position
of women in today's society. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has worked dili-
gently to create a fair system of marital property distribution, and should be
commended for its efforts.
275. The Ferguson guidelines are one example of the court addressing issues that were not before it,
because many of the guidelines did not relate to the Ferguson case itself. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d
921, 928 (Miss. 1994).
276. This is evidenced by the fact that in Ferguson, Heinsley, and Johnson the court looked to other jurisdic-
tions to help them define the new doctrine of equitable distribution.
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